A detailed reassessment of Mao’s late-era policies and their influence on China’s military and diplomatic strategy in the lead-up to the 1979 Sino–Vietnamese War.

Mao’s Final Legacies and the Sino–Vietnamese War, 1971–79 provides a critical reassessment of Mao Zedong’s influence on the events leading up to the 1979 conflict between China and Vietnam. Chenyi Wang examines the institutional and policy decisions made during Mao’s final years, analyzing how these decisions shaped China’s military and diplomatic approaches.

After the 1971 Lin Biao Incident, the People’s Liberation Army underwent significant organizational changes. At the same time, China’s anti-Soviet and pro–Khmer Rouge policies influenced the regional strategic environment. Post-Mao leaders inherited this policy framework and continued key elements, including military adjustments and foreign policy orientations toward the Soviet Union and Cambodia.

Drawing on newly accessible Chinese archival sources, internal documents, and participant memoirs, Wang traces how these continuities affected China’s military readiness and diplomatic decision-making in the lead-up to the war. His analysis highlights the enduring impact of late-Mao policy decisions on the strategies and options available to his successors.