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Distributed for Center for the Study of Language and Information

Logic, Convention, and Common Knowledge

A Conventionalist Account of Logic

One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of events—a revisiting of Lewis’s Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray’s classic coordination problem, wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means.

166 pages | 6 x 9 | © 2002

Lecture Notes

Language and Linguistics: Formal Logic and Computational Linguistics, Syntax and Semantics

Philosophy: Logic and Philosophy of Language

Table of Contents

1. Conventionalism: Setting Out the Problem
2. Games and Equilibria
3. Conventions
4. Common Knowledge and Coordination
5. Conventional Knowledge and Belief
6. The Origins of Mutual Understanding
7. A Logic of Familiarity
8. Three Grades of Epistemic Involvement
9. A Logic of Awareness
10. Convention Revisited
11. Conventions in Logic

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