Skip to main content

Law and Public Choice

A Critical Introduction

In Law and Public Choice, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich
and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first
systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey
carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group influence and provide a nonmathematical introduction to formal models of legislative action. Ideal for course use, this volume offers a balanced and perceptive analysis and critique of an approach which, within limits, can illuminate the dynamics of government decision-making.

Law and Public Choice is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It
should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at the intersection of government and law.”—Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law

Table of Contents

1. Interest Groups and the Political Process
I. The Impact of Interest Group Theory
II. Interest Groups and Political Science
III. The Economic Theory of Legislation
IV. Normative Implications
2. Arrow’s Theorem and the Democratic Process
I. Arrow’s Theorem and Its Implications
II. Republicanism
III. Chaos and Coherence in Legislatures
IV. Public Choice and Legislative Deliberation
3. Economic Regulation and the Constitution
I. Economic Rights and the Constitution
II. Federalism
III. The Delegation Doctrine
4. Statutory Interpretation
I. Legislative Intent
II. Legislative History
III. Ambiguous Language and Rational Choice
IV. Statutory Evolution
5. Integrating Public Choice and Public Law
I. Existing Strands of "Due Process of Lawmaking"
II. Expanding the Influence of Public Choice in Public Law
Epilogue: Beyond the Economic Sphere

Be the first to know

Get the latest updates on new releases, special offers, and media highlights when you subscribe to our email lists!

Sign up here for updates about the Press