Skip to main content
Shopping cart: items Cart

The Congressional Endgame

Interchamber Bargaining and Compromise

Congress is a bicameral legislature in which both the House and Senate must pass a bill before it can be enacted into law. The US bicameral system also differs from most democracies in that the two chambers have relatively equal power to legislate and must find ways to resolve their disputes. In the current landscape of party polarization, this contentious process has become far more chaotic, leading to the public perception that the House and Senate are unwilling or unable to compromise and calling into question the effectiveness of the bicameral system itself.

With The Congressional Endgame, Josh M. Ryan offers a coherent explanation of how the bicameral legislative process works in Congress and shows that the types of policy outcomes it produces are in line with those intended by the framers of the Constitution. Although each bargaining outcome may seem idiosyncratic, the product of strong leadership and personality politics, interchamber bargaining outcomes in Congress are actually structured by observable institutional factors. Ryan finds that the characteristics of the winning coalition are critically important to which chamber “wins” after bargaining, with both conference committees and an alternative resolution venue, amendment trading, creating policy that approximates the preferences of the more moderate chamber. Although slow and incremental, interchamber negotiations serve their intended purpose well, The Congressional Endgame shows; they increase the odds of compromise while at the same time offering a powerful constraint on dramatic policy changes.

240 pages | 14 line drawings, 28 tables | 6 x 9 | © 2018 

Political Science: American Government and Politics

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1 Does Bicameralism Work in the Modern Congress?
Chapter 2 Postpassage Resolution in Historical and Contemporary Context: Process, Procedures, and Controversies
Chapter 3 A Bargaining Theory of Postpassage Resolution
Chapter 4 Bargaining Frequency and the Use of Conference Committees or Amendment Trading
Chapter 5 Conferee Discretion and Bill Failure in Conference Committees
Chapter 6 Conference Committees and Policy Change after Passage
Chapter 7 Bill Failure and Policy Change as a Result of Amendment Trading
Chapter 8 Conclusion: Postpassage Resolution and Legislative Outcomes

Notes
References
Index

Be the first to know

Get the latest updates on new releases, special offers, and media highlights when you subscribe to our email lists!

Sign up here for updates about the Press