Corporate Interest, Ideology, and Leadership in the Shaping of Accounting Rules for the Market Economy
With Political Standards, Karthik Ramanna develops the notion of “thin political markets” to describe a key problem facing technical rule-making in corporate accounting and beyond. When standard-setting boards attempt to regulate the accounting practices of corporations, they must draw on a small pool of qualified experts—but those experts almost always have strong commercial interests in the outcome. Meanwhile, standard setting rarely enjoys much attention from the general public. This absence of accountability, Ramanna argues, allows corporate managers to game the system. In the profit-maximization framework of modern capitalism, the only practicable solution is to reframe managerial norms when participating in thin political markets. Political Standards will be an essential resource for understanding how the rules of the game are set, whom they inevitably favor, and how the process can be changed for a better capitalism.
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2. The Benchmark: What Should GAAP Look Like?
3. Goodwill Hunting: The Political Economy of Accountability for Mergers and Acquisitions
4. The Shrinking Big N: Rule-Making Incentives of the Tightening Oligopoly in Auditing
5. Why Fair Value Is the Rule: The Changing Nature of Standard Setters
6. Local Interests in Global Games: The Cases of China and India
7. My Own Private Company Council: How a New Accounting Rule-Maker Is Born
8. Political Standards: Lobbying in Thin Political Markets
9. Managers and Market Capitalism