The Structure of Legal Entitlements
Ayres identifies flaws in the current system and shows how option theory can radically expand and improve the ways that lawmakers structure legal entitlements. An option-based system, Ayres shows, gives parties the option to purchase—or the option to sell—the relevant legal entitlement. Choosing to exercise a legal option forces decisionmakers to reveal information about their own valuation of the entitlement. And, as with auctions, entitlements in option-based law naturally flow to those who value them the most. Seeing legal entitlements through this lens suggests a variety of new entitlement structures from which lawmakers might choose. Optional Law provides a theory for determining which structure is likely to be most effective in harnessing parties' private information.
Proposing a practical approach to the foundational question of how to allocate and protect legal rights, Optional Law will be applauded by legal scholars and professionals who continue to seek new and better ways of fostering both equitable and efficient legal rules.
Chapter 1: The Bill of Options?
Part One: Bilateral Disputes
Chapter 2: Puts as Well as Calls
Chapter 3: Single-Chooser Rules
Chapter 4: Dual-Chooser Rules
Chapter 5: Higher-Order Liability Rules
Part Two: Extensions
Chapter 6: Correlated Values
Chapter 7: Multiple Takings
Chapter 8: Relaxing Other (Administrative, Informational, and Cognitive) Assumptions
Chapter 9: Bargaining in the Shadow of Different Regimes
Ian Ayres and Eric Talley
Chapter 10: Testing the Bargaining Model
Chapter 11: The Property/Liability Rule Debate