Supreme Court Economic Review, Volume 20
9780226995816
Supreme Court Economic Review, Volume 20
The Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to provide a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad ranging, and contributions employ explicit or implicit economic reasoning for the analysis of legal issues, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design.
300 pages | 6 1/8 x 9 1/4 | © 2012
Economics and Business: Economics--General Theory and Principles
Law and Legal Studies: The Constitution and the Courts
Table of Contents
1. Does Anyone Get Stopped at the Gate? An Empirical Assessment of the Daubert Trilogy in the States
Eric Helland and Jonathan Klick
Eric Helland and Jonathan Klick
2. Economic Value or Fair Market Value: What Form of Takings Compensation Is Efficient?
Yun-chien Chang
3. Organizing Crime
Peter T. Leeson and Douglas Bruce Rogers
4. Daubert, Science, and Modern Game Theory: Implications for Merger Analysis
Malcolm B. Coate and Jeffrey H. Fischer
5. Economics of the Independent Invention Defense under Incomplete Information
Murat C. Mungan