

Online Appendix for Chapter 2: Voting with Class

Roll Call Voting Models Estimated Using Alternative Social Class Variables

Tables A.3 through A.7 below reproduce tables 2.1 through 2.5 but include coefficients for all control variables, which I omitted in chapter 2 to save space (and to draw the reader's attention to the main attraction, the social class gaps in legislative voting).

Table A.3. Class and economic voting in Congress, 1999–2008

	1	2	3
<i>Economic voting measure</i>	(Rescaled) DW-NOM	Chamber of Commerce	(Rescaled) AFL-CIO
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>			
Technical professional	4.02 ⁺ (2.30)	−5.45 ⁺ (3.14)	−0.38 (2.24)
Business owner/executive	2.26* (1.14)	3.04 ⁺ (1.80)	2.53 (1.92)
Business employee	1.54 (1.13)	−0.64 (1.95)	0.88 (1.84)
Farm owner/manager	0.55 (1.84)	7.07* (3.07)	8.26* (3.20)
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>			
Military/law enforcement	−0.59 (1.29)	−0.94 (2.15)	−1.05 (2.00)
Lawyer (omitted)	—	—	—
Politician/staff member	−1.04 (0.87)	−2.44 ⁺ (1.47)	−3.06* (1.44)
Service-based professional	−3.07** (1.15)	−2.91 (1.84)	−2.90 ⁺ (1.76)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>			
Worker	−5.66* (2.42)	−11.55** (3.73)	−9.65* (3.95)
<i>Other occupations</i>			
Other	−0.03 (6.26)	7.07 (5.43)	2.06 (6.12)
<i>Legislator controls</i>			

Republican (indicator)	27.43** (0.72)	32.22** (1.40)	58.87** (1.78)
Age	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.12** (0.03)
Asian (indicator)	-1.86 (1.402)	-4.00* (1.852)	-4.29** (1.51)

Black (indicator)	-4.29** (1.01)	-2.16 (1.87)	-4.79** (1.52)
Hispanic (indicator)	-4.03** (0.97)	-0.62 (1.72)	-6.25** (1.51)
Native American (indicator)	-5.62** (1.01)	-2.09 (1.57)	-9.97** (1.56)
Female (indicator)	-0.92 ⁺ (0.55)	0.76 (0.93)	-1.05 (0.87)
Jewish (indicator)	1.58 (1.88)	-1.59 (5.15)	1.07 (5.07)
Mainline Protestant (indicator)	3.87* (1.57)	0.94 (5.02)	5.79 (5.00)
Catholic (indicator)	3.49* (1.65)	-1.05 (5.06)	3.44 (5.03)
Eastern Orthodox (indicator)	-0.75 (2.74)	0.64 (5.06)	8.04 (5.04)
Conservative Protestant (indicator)	4.96** (1.52)	-2.97 (5.99)	-2.04 (5.23)
Other faiths (indicator)	3.10 ⁺ (1.62)	1.51 (5.09)	4.99 (5.04)

Campaign donation controls

Total contributions	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 ⁺ (0.00)	0.00 ⁺ (0.00)
Corporate contributions	0.00 (0.000)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Labor contributions	0.00** (0.000)	0.00* (0.000)	0.00** (0.00)

Constituency controls

Percent urban	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Percent white	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.10** (0.02)

Percent farmers	-0.75* (0.36)	0.13 (0.63)	0.35 (0.66)
Percent business owners/executives	-0.31 (0.32)	-0.15 (0.52)	0.71 (0.57)
Percent business employees	-0.11 (0.40)	-0.77 (0.73)	0.83 (0.70)
<hr/>			
Percent tech. professionals and lawyers	-0.78* (0.37)	-1.24* (0.62)	-0.09 (0.64)
Percent service-based professionals	-0.50 (0.33)	-0.89 (0.56)	0.06 (0.60)
Percent workers	-0.53 (0.33)	-0.96 ⁺ (0.56)	0.16 (0.59)
Median household income	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Percent union	-10.93** (2.86)	-5.29 (5.62)	-1.20 (4.67)
Partisanship (1-7 scale)	-2.60** (0.638)	-1.58 (1.10)	-10.16** (1.29)
Ideology (1-5 scale)	-8.88** (1.497)	-17.06** (2.51)	-3.56 (2.67)
Legislator's last vote margin	-0.03* (0.013)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Intercept	123.53** (33.38)	202.53** (55.83)	61.55 (58.80)
<i>N</i>	2,626	2,594	2,594
<i>R</i> ²	0.93	0.80	0.93

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Lawyer is the omitted occupational category. All three outcome variables are scaled so that they range from 0 to 100, with higher values signifying more conservative voting.

Table A.4. Class and voting on noneconomic issues in Congress, 1999–2008

<i>Voting measure</i>	1a	2a	3a
	(Rescaled) 2nd-dimension DW-NOM	(Rescaled) NEA	(Rescaled) ACLU
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>			
Technical professional	2.81 (2.75)	1.12 (2.63)	-3.58 (4.10)
Business owner/executive	2.35 (2.02)	3.47 ⁺ (1.82)	3.39 (2.22)
Business employee	5.13* (2.23)	2.29 (2.04)	1.53 (2.52)
Farm owner/manager	9.51 ⁺ (5.27)	0.60 (4.39)	12.62** (4.06)
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>			
Military/law enforcement	0.62 (3.68)	-1.30 (2.32)	7.47* (3.09)
Lawyer (omitted)	—	—	—
Politician/staff member	-1.07 (1.83)	-1.79 (1.52)	0.87 (2.22)
Service-based professional	-1.45 (2.27)	-0.83 (2.08)	-5.65* (2.86)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>			
Worker	-4.38 (5.53)	-3.06 (5.18)	-14.67* (6.38)
<i>Other occupations</i>			
Other	-14.78 (13.71)	-34.23 (23.63)	-16.10 (10.31)
<i>Legislator controls</i>			
Republican (indicator)	-20.53** (1.50)	60.17** (2.02)	41.14** (2.12)
Age	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.18** (0.05)
Asian (indicator)	1.47 (4.74)	-3.26 (2.19)	-8.20** (2.54)

Black (indicator)	-6.81** (2.20)	-2.71 (1.70)	-10.53** (2.37)
Hispanic (indicator)	-5.54* (2.68)	-6.01** (2.23)	-8.99** (3.02)
Native American (indicator)	20.45** (2.13)	-5.15* (2.09)	-3.07 (2.21)
Female (indicator)	-3.24** (1.08)	-3.63** (1.09)	-3.19* (1.34)
Jewish (indicator)	-7.82 (6.07)	1.10 (2.20)	-2.12 (2.92)
Mainline Protestant (indicator)	-2.74 (5.91)	4.13* (1.93)	4.05 ⁺ (2.45)
Catholic (indicator)	-1.11 (6.02)	3.36 ⁺ (1.97)	4.79 ⁺ (2.67)
Eastern Orthodox (indicator)	-4.59 (6.99)	-2.88 (4.67)	-0.22 (6.91)
Conservative Protestant (indicator)	-0.12 (5.90)	7.70** (1.93)	6.11** (2.18)
Other faiths (indicator)	-0.08 (5.94)	4.08* (2.00)	3.12 (2.69)
<i>Campaign donation controls</i>			
Total contributions	0.00 ⁺ (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Corporate contributions	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Labor contributions	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
<i>Constituency controls</i>			
Percent urban	-0.12** (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.12* (0.04)
Percent white	0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Percent farmers	-2.17** (0.79)	0.00 (0.73)	-4.00** (0.87)
Percent business owners/executives	-1.73** (0.65)	0.41 (0.64)	-2.20** (0.75)
Percent business employees	-1.13 (0.92)	1.14 (0.75)	-1.21 (1.00)

Percent tech. professionals and lawyers	-2.23** (0.77)	-0.06 (0.69)	-3.39** (0.88)
Percent service-based professionals	-1.91** (0.72)	0.24 (0.64)	-2.35** (0.79)
Percent workers	-1.93** (0.72)	0.32 (0.63)	-2.75** (0.79)
Median household income	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Percent union	-20.42** (5.96)	-2.46 (5.60)	-0.20 (6.87)
Partisanship (1-7 scale)	-3.06* (1.34)	-5.24** (1.78)	-8.21** (1.66)
Ideology (1-5 scale)	-23.19** (3.10)	1.30 (3.56)	-19.45** (3.68)
Legislator's last vote margin	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Intercept	342.01** (72.97)	3.15 (63.36)	397.55** (79.50)
<i>N</i>	2,594	1,565	2,593
<i>R</i> ²	0.84	0.91	0.80

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Lawyer is the omitted occupational category. Coefficients for control variables and for the “other occupations” category are omitted. All three outcome variables are scaled so that they range from 0 to 100, with higher values signifying more conservative voting.

Table A.5. Class and economic voting in postwar Congresses

	4	5
<i>Economic voting measure</i>	(Rescaled) DW-NOM	(Rescaled) AFL-CIO
<i>Time frame</i>	1963–96	1971–92
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>		
Technical professional	1.17 (0.75)	2.48 (2.00)
Business owner/employee	0.99* (0.41)	2.02 (1.70)
Farm owner/manager	3.54** (0.81)	13.14** (3.04)
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>		
Lawyer (omitted)	—	—
Politician/other	−0.04 (0.44)	−0.57 (1.63)
Service-based professional	−0.82 (0.58)	−2.54 (1.77)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>		
Worker	−1.47 (1.44)	−4.05 (3.42)
<i>Legislator controls</i>		
Republican (indicator)	18.71** (0.35)	51.39** (1.39)
Age	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.05)
Asian (indicator)	−6.45** (1.04)	−21.14** (3.92)
Black (indicator)	−9.00** (0.86)	−18.07** (3.11)
Hispanic (indicator)	−4.57** (1.37)	−11.61** (4.33)
Female (indicator)	−1.34* (0.62)	−4.15 ⁺ (2.20)

Constituency controls

Republican vote margin in last presidential election	17.47** (0.96)	71.21** (4.85)
Percent white	-0.07** (0.01)	71.21** (4.85)
Median age	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.35** (0.05)
Median family income	0.00 (0.00)	-0.85** (0.20)
Legislator's last vote margin	4.63** (0.84)	0.00** (0.00)
Intercept	33.13** (1.88)	20.60** (3.08)
<i>N</i>	7,422	4,244
<i>R</i> ²	0.78	0.72

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Lawyer is the omitted occupational category. Both outcome variables are scaled so that they range from 0 to 100, with higher values signifying more conservative voting.

Table A.6. Class, political experience, and economic voting in postwar Congresses

	6	7
<i>Political experience measure</i>	Terms in Congress (1–35)	# of levels of gov't prior (0–3)
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>		
Technical professional	4.12** (1.00)	3.93* (1.53)
Technical professional × political experience	−0.15 (0.15)	−0.32 (0.83)
Businessperson	1.35 (0.94)	3.23** (1.22)
Businessperson × political experience	−0.05 (0.14)	−2.01* (0.90)
Farm owner/manager	1.43** (0.52)	1.22 (0.79)
Farm owner/manager × political experience	−0.11 (0.08)	−0.26 (0.56)
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>		
Politician/other	−0.44 (0.56)	0.97 (1.05)
Politician/other × political experience	0.07 (0.09)	−0.70 (0.72)
Service-based professional	−0.78 (0.62)	−0.14 (1.08)
Service-based professional × political experience	−0.02 (0.11)	−0.65 (0.85)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>		
Worker	−2.60 (1.73)	−2.02 (2.27)
Worker × political experience	0.16 (0.15)	0.48 (1.19)
Political experience	−0.16** (0.06)	−0.47 (0.31)
<i>Legislator controls</i>		
Republican (indicator)	18.56** (0.35)	18.64** (0.35)

Age	0.04*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Asian (indicator)	-6.52**	-6.36**
	(1.13)	(0.97)
Black (indicator)	-9.23**	-9.02**
	(0.88)	(0.87)
Hispanic (indicator)	-4.66**	-4.35**
	(1.38)	(1.34)
Female (indicator)	-1.76**	-1.42*
	(0.62)	(0.59)
<i>Constituency controls</i>		
Republican vote margin in last presidential election	17.40**	17.58**
	(0.97)	(0.95)
Percent white	-0.07**	-0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Median age	-0.14**	-0.14**
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Median family income	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Legislator's last vote margin	5.13**	4.72**
	(0.86)	(0.83)
Intercept	31.24**	33.42**
	(1.96)	(1.95)
<i>N</i>	7,422	7,411
<i>R</i> ²	0.78	0.78

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Lawyer is the omitted occupational category.

Table A.7. The stability of the working-class difference, 1999–2008

	8	9	10
<i>Economic voting measure</i>	(Rescaled) DW-NOM	Chamber of commerce	(Rescaled) AFL-CIO
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>			
Technical professional	3.46 (2.36)	-6.86* (3.20)	-0.13 (2.29)
Business owner/executive	1.77 (1.14)	1.85 (1.74)	2.78 (1.98)
Business employee	1.58 (1.12)	-0.68 (1.95)	0.83 (1.86)
Farm owner/manager	0.16 (1.79)	5.98+ (3.10)	8.41* (3.25)
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>			
Military/law enforcement	-0.16 (1.24)	0.13 (2.06)	-1.27 (2.04)
Lawyer (omitted)	—	—	—
Politician/staff member	2.38* (1.20)	6.17** (2.06)	-4.81* (2.24)
Service-based professional	-3.37** (1.13)	-3.68* (1.86)	-2.78 (1.77)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>			
Worker	-1.35 (5.79)	-9.82 (9.97)	-15.92 ⁺ (9.29)
Worker × years in politics	-0.23 (0.24)	-0.15 (0.49)	0.30 (0.33)
Years in politics	-0.13** (0.03)	-0.33** (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
<i>Other occupations</i>			
Other	-0.97 (5.42)	4.44 (5.11)	2.49 (5.97)
<i>Legislator controls</i>			
Republican (indicator)	27.26** (0.72)	31.80** (1.39)	58.96** (1.80)
Age	0.01 (0.03)	0.11* (0.05)	-0.16** (0.05)
Asian (indicator)	-2.44+ (1.43)	-5.09** (1.70)	-3.83* (1.66)
Black (indicator)	-4.45**	-2.65	-4.74**

	(1.00)	(1.83)	(1.53)
Hispanic (indicator)	-4.18** (0.96)	-0.97 (1.70)	-6.16** (1.51)
Native American (indicator)	-5.89** (0.99)	-2.70 ⁺ (1.56)	-9.79** (1.57)
Female (indicator)	-1.16* (0.55)	0.24 (0.93)	-0.90 (0.89)
Jewish (indicator)	1.81 (2.23)	-2.10 (4.56)	1.18 (5.15)
Mainline Protestant (indicator)	4.06* (1.97)	0.37 (4.41)	5.93 (5.09)
Catholic (indicator)	3.78+ (2.03)	-1.44 (4.45)	3.52 (5.12)
Eastern Orthodox (indicator)	-0.30 (2.84)	0.65 (4.46)	8.03 (5.13)
Conservative Protestant (indicator)	5.40** (1.93)	-3.97 (6.22)	-1.77 (5.32)
Other faiths (indicator)	3.01 (2.02)	0.21 (4.49)	5.27 (5.11)
<i>Campaign donation controls</i>			
Total contributions	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 ⁺ (0.00)
Corporate contributions	0.00* (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Labor contributions	0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
<i>Constituency controls</i>			
Percent urban	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Percent white	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.10** (0.02)
Percent farmers	-0.69+ (0.36)	0.24 (0.61)	0.32 (0.66)
Percent bus. owners/executives	-0.27 (0.32)	-0.07 (0.51)	0.68 (0.58)
Percent business employees	-0.05 (0.40)	-0.64 (0.71)	0.80 (0.71)
Percent tech. prof./lawyers	-0.72* (0.36)	-1.11 ⁺ (0.60)	-0.12 (0.65)

Percent service-based professionals	-0.46 (0.33)	-0.81 (0.55)	0.03 (0.60)
Percent workers	-0.48 (0.33)	-0.85 (0.55)	0.13 (0.60)
Median household income	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Percent union	-8.90** (2.83)	-0.56 (5.54)	-2.32 (4.91)
Partisanship (1–7 scale)	-2.95** (0.65)	-2.43* (1.09)	-9.97** (1.31)
Ideology (1–5 scale)	-7.91** (1.55)	-14.65** (2.50)	-4.10 (2.73)
Legislator's last vote margin	-0.03 ⁺ (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Intercept	114.31** (33.05)	182.48** (54.08)	66.96 (59.36)
<i>N</i>	2,626	2,594	2,594
<i>R</i> ²	0.93	0.80	0.93

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Lawyer is the omitted occupational category. All three outcome variables are scaled so that they range from 0 to 100, with higher values signifying more conservative voting.

Regression Models Summarized in Figure 2.6

Table A.8. Regression models relating class and rescaled DW-NOMINATE scores in the Senate,
by election cycle, 1963–96

	11	12
	Term before election	Term after election
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>		
Business owner/employee	1.91 (3.10)	4.21 ⁺ (2.22)
Farm owner/manager	1.82 (1.27)	2.28 ⁺ (1.31)
Technical professional	2.87 (2.10)	5.43** (1.99)
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>		
Lawyer (omitted)	—	—
Politician/other	1.28 (2.05)	2.26 (2.03)
Service-based professional	-1.60 (1.80)	0.08 (1.66)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>		
Worker (no cases)	—	—
<i>Legislator controls</i>		
Age	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Female (indicator)	-4.98* (2.42)	-5.62** (2.13)
Black (indicator)	-16.42** (1.12)	-9.94** (1.10)
Hispanic (indicator)	2.45* (1.13)	1.44 (1.40)
Asian (indicator)	-7.48* (3.30)	-9.64** (3.07)

Republican (indicator)	20.45** (1.065)	20.06** (0.945)
<i>Constituency controls</i>		
Rep. vote share in last pres. election	14.42** (3.395)	14.22** (2.971)
Percent white	-0.12* (0.056)	-0.17** (0.047)
Median age	-0.40 ⁺ (0.23)	-0.33 (0.23)
Median family income	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Legislator's vote share in last election	11.50** (3.44)	7.48* (3.15)
Intercept	38.46** (8.63)	43.07** (8.12)
<i>N</i>	415	424
<i>R</i> ²	0.73	0.77

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Lawyer is the omitted occupational category.

Roll Call Voting Models Estimated Using Alternative Social Class Variables

Figure A.1 below reports coefficients from separate models in which I regressed rescaled DW-NOMINATE scores on each of six class measures (one at a time) and on the control variables used in the models in table 2.1. White bars represent coefficients that were significant at $p < 0.10$; black bars represent nonsignificant coefficients. In the upper left panel, the social class independent variables are the same occupational proportions used in the models in table 2.1; in the upper right panel, the social class variables are parental occupational proportions. Lawyers are the omitted category in both models. In the other four panels, the social class variables (net worth, income, educational attainment, and median endowment per pupil at colleges attended) were measured using indicators for the categories listed on the vertical axis (although using continuous versions of income, net worth, and college endowment produced similar results). The omitted categories were 0 to 500k for net worth, 0 to 200k for income, college for highest degree, and 0 to 20k for median endowment per student.


Coefficients for legislators' own occupations were ordered sensibly, and coefficients for the four occupational categories that were most ideologically distant from the omitted category were statistically significant. For parental occupations, on the other hand, only two categories were significant (we would expect one in ten by chance alone) and the ordering was erratic. Coefficients for the net worth, income, highest degree earned, and median college endowment measures did not appear to follow any pattern, either.

Results were substantively similar when I used Chamber of Commerce scores or rescaled AFL-CIO scores in place of rescaled DW-NOMINATE scores.


Figure A.1. [see following page] Coefficients from models relating DW-NOMINATE scores and alternative measures of social class.

Bars report coefficients from OLS models that regressed rescaled DW-NOMINATE scores on the class measures in question and the control variables used in table 2.1. White bars represent coefficients that were significantly distinct from the omitted categories at $p < 0.10$; black bars represent nonsignificant coefficients.


Occupation




Parent's occupation




Net worth



Outside income



Highest degree earned



College endowment / student

