The Supreme Court Economic Review, Volume 16

Edited by Francesco Parisi, Lloyd R. Cohen, and Daniel D. Polsby

Edited by Francesco Parisi, Lloyd R. Cohen, and Daniel D. Polsby

350 pages | 6-1/8 x 9-1/4 | © 2008
Cloth $50.00 ISBN: 9780226645988 Published November 2008
Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to provide a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad ranging and contributions employ explicit or implicit economic reasoning for the analysis of legal issues, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design. Volume 16 contributors are Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Vincy Fon, Nuno Garoupa, Keith N. Hylton, Sheldon Kimmel, Tonja Jacobi, David M. Levy, John O. McGinnis, Sandra J. Peart, Michael Rappaport, Neil S. Siegel, and Todd J. Zywicki.
Contents
The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets
Tonja Jacobi

The Condorcet Case for Supermajority Rules
John O. McGinnis and Michael Rappaport

The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Nuno Garoupa

Integral Proportional System: Aligning Electoral Votes More Closely with State Popular Votes
Vincy Fon

Adam Smith, Collusion and “Right” at the Supreme Court
David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart

Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis
Neil S. Siegel

Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory
Keith N. Hylton

How and Why the Per Se Rule Against Price-Fixing Went Wrong
Sheldon Kimmel
For more information, or to order this book, please visit http://www.press.uchicago.edu
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