The Challenger Launch Decision
Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA
Journalists and investigators have historically cited production problems and managerial wrong-doing as the reasons behind the disaster. The Presidential Commission uncovered a flawed decision-making process at the space agency as well, citing a well-documented history of problems with the O-ring and a dramatic last-minute protest by engineers over the Solid Rocket Boosters as evidence of managerial neglect.
Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them.
No safety rules were broken. No single individual was at fault. Instead, the cause of the disaster is a story not of evil but of the banality of organizational life. This powerful work explains why the Challenger tragedy must be reexamined and offers an unexpected warning about the hidden hazards of living in this technological age.
ASA Science, Knowledge, Technology Sect: ASA - Robert K. Merton Award
Society for Social Studies of Science: Rachel Carson Prize
1: The Eve of the Launch
2: Learning Culture, Revising History
3: Risk, Work Group Culture, and the Normalization of Deviance
4: The Normalization of Deviance, 1981-1984
5: The Normalization of Deviance, 1985
6: The Culture of Production
7: Structural Secrecy
8: The Eve of the Launch Revisited
9: Conformity and Tragedy
10: Lessons Learned
Appendix A. Cost/Safety Trade-Offs? Scrapping the Escape Rockets and the SRB Contract Award Decision
Appendix B. Supporting Charts and Documents
Appendix C. On Theory Elaboration, Organizations, and Historical Ethnography